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Abstract This paper seeks to examine the effect of economic, social and political globalization
on parties’ overall positions. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel model of 34 political
parties in 17 west European countries between 1970 and 2010. We find that both economic and
social globalization have a significant effect on parties’ positions, whereas political
globalization seems to have less of an influence. However, the effect of globalization varies
depending on the type of political party. Right-wing parties move leftward in response to all
types of globalization while left-wing parties do not alter their position, or move rightward.
Moreover, we find strong evidence about party’s influence of the positions that parties in other
countries take. These findings give support for the existence of parties’ convergence in the face
of globalization with right-wing parties coming closer to left-wing parties, rejecting the
established in the literature argument of the so-called “neoliberal convergence”.
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11 Introduction
The positions that political parties strategically choose have been the focus of debate in both
economics and political science. Most of the studies on parties’ positions have empirically
tested the theoretical model of Downs (1957). The general finding is that parties in
industrialized democracies respond to voters’ preferences (e.g. McDonald & Budge, 2005;
Adams et al., 2004). Besides voter preferences, however, other factors related to economy and
society can influence party competition.
A growing literature has found that such a factor is higher economic integration, also
referred to as globalization (Adams et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2011). Economic integration,
however, is only one aspect of a multifaceted phenomenon, i.e. globalization. Developed
economies, especially in Western Europe, have undergone substantial changes in the social and
political realm which may have influenced equally the position of political parties. With this
paper we contribute to the existing literature by examining the effect of various aspects of
globalization on the positions that parties take in their election programs.
Even though globalization can have a direct effect on parties’ positions, it can also have
an indirect effect by creating common ideological trends among parties in different countries
(Kaiser, 2009). For this reason, in our empirical model we add a variable that captures the
positions of ideologically close parties in other European countries. As social, political and
economic ties among European states become more pronounced, voters might be influenced by
the behavior of their “neighbors”. At the same time, parties might adopt positions that their
peers in other countries adopted. To our knowledge this is the first study that examines this
effect for parties’ positions, whether they are in government or not.
Our results shed light in two main hypotheses. The first one suggests a significant
relationship between party positions and both economic and social globalization. Many studies
have shown a significant effect of economic and social globalization on individual party’s
policies (e.g. Rodrik, 1998; Dreher et al., 2007).1 They have shown that globalization, either
economic or social, moves parties leftward in some policies (e.g. increase social spending) and
rightward in others (e.g. increase labor tax rates). Since these two types of globalization affect
some parties’ policies we expect that they also affect parties’ overall position. It should be
mentioned that a party’s overall position is considered more important than an individual
1 The findings of these studies are discussed in detail in Section 2.
2party’s policy in the sense that it includes all the optimal policies of a party and not only a
specific one.
The second hypothesis is related to another strand of the literature which investigates
the partisan differences between left-wing and right-wing parties. Numerous studies on Partisan
Theory suggest that left-wing and right-wing parties have different response to economic
conditions such as inflation, unemployment and economic integration (e.g. Hibbs, 1987;
Herwartz and Theilen, 2014). In addition, some studies have found that economic globalization
leads parties to converge in particular policies, such as economic policies (e.g. Dorussen and
Nanou, 2013; Ward et al., 2015). However, they do not identify the direction (left-right)
towards which the parties move. According to our second hypothesis parties of unlike
ideological groups move in a different direction in an increase of economic or social
globalization. Specifically, we argue that parties tend to converge in their overall position, with
right-wing parties moving leftward. This argument is based on the fact that globalization makes
the positions of left-wing parties more attractive to voters; either because they face economic
globalization as risk for their income stability (Rodrik, 1998) or because social globalization
makes society more flexible to social issues.
We test the above hypotheses through an empirical analysis which builds on a panel
dataset which includes 34 political parties of 17 Western European countries, over the period
1970-2010. Political parties have a range of unobservable characteristics that we should take
into account, e.g. parties belong to different countries with different constitutions and historical
characteristics. As a result, a cross sectional analysis, as this of Adams et al. (2009), is subject
to possible bias of the results. We tackle this problem by using party and year fixed effects to
control for the influence of fixed unobservable party factors (Ward et al, 2011). Moreover we
control for the possible influence of parties in other countries by including the average position
of parties abroad. Finally we add in a set of control variables related to economic, demographic
and political factors.
Regarding the dependent variable, party’s overall position, comes from the Comparative
Manifesto Project (CMP) database while as main independent variable we use the three KOF
globalization indices (economic, social and political), separately in each regression, to estimate
the multifaceted phenomenon of globalization (Dreher, 2006). The main findings suggest that
parties’ position is mainly affected by economic and social globalization, and indicate a party
convergence in the face of globalization, with right-wing parties moving leftward.
3While the above analysis has tackled the issue of time-invariant characteristics, it does
not take into account the influence of time-varying omitted variables. We confront this critical
issue by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach which mitigates such concerns for
potential endogeneity. The analysis is based on the established results that countries with higher
levels of human capital tend to be more globalized (Hickman and Olney, 2011). Therefore,
human capital index is used as instrument for globalization, which has zero correlation with
parties’ position and high correlation with globalization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and
elaborates the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the empirical
model. Section 4 presents the main empirical results while Section 5 includes the robustness
check of our estimations. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main points.
2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section we try to shape theoretical hypotheses about a party’s overall position and
globalization, which are based on existing evidence. The link between political parties and
globalization has been examined by both economists and political scientists, but the relationship
is ambiguous. For the sake of simplicity, we separate the section in two parts. In the first part
we formulate the existing findings on the relationship between globalization and parties’
policies and elaborate the first hypothesis. In the second part we introduce the case of
partisanship and the second hypothesis is derived.
2.1 Globalization and parties’ policies
There is an extensive literature on the impact of economic globalization on welfare and
economic policies (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997, 1998; Dreher et al., 2008b; Leibrecht et al.,
2011). Also, fewer studies have examined the impact of social globalization on social spending
and labor policies (Dreher and Gaston, 2007; Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). Nevertheless, the
estimated results are ambiguous and leave an opening for doubt about the precise response of
parties to globalization.
According to the findings of the literature, economic globalization seems to have various
and many times opposite effects on parties’ policies (Adam and Kammas, 2007; Dreher et al.
2008b). This fact is easily understood if someone considers that parties’ platforms consist of
4diverse policies which likely apply to different directions (left-right). In other words, parties
could respond to globalization by moving their position leftward in some policies and rightward
in others; and this is one of the main reasons we use a party’s overall position. Another reason
is that parties give particular attention on their overall position, since voters care about multiple
issues as globalization increases and support a party for its overall position and not a specific
one. Finally, it should be noted that while most of the studies mentioned above referred to
governmental action are directly connected to our analysis – which includes parties either
participating in government or not – because governments are nothing else than political parties
coming to power through their electoral programs.
Besides economic globalization, social globalization has been found to have a significant
effect on parties’ policies, as it represents human mobility and the exchange of information and
cultural characteristics among countries. Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) have shown that social
globalization has a positive influence on government spending, on the grounds that the more
people are globally interconnected, the more they observe the government size in other
countries and demand more expenditures in their country. Furthermore, social globalization has
an effect on working class in the sense that informs unions’ members about the limited
bargaining power due to externalities (Dreher and Gaston, 2007).
Given that both economic and social globalization affect party policies and that the mean
value of each one is high in our sample (see Table A.2 in Appendix), we construct the first
hypothesis, labeled as Parties’ position is affected by both economic and social globalization
(H1). In other words, we expect economic and social globalization to have a significant effect
on parties’ overall position which includes positions on topics related to economy and the
organization of society. We do not expect the same about political globalization, since it is less
perceptible by the people and many studies have found no significant effect of on parties’
policies.
2.2 The matter of partisanship on globalization effect
The examination of party responsiveness to globalization requires paying particular attention to
party’s identity.2 Political parties are not only office-seekers but they are also policy-seekers,
having their ideology and fundamental principles (Boix, 1998). A rich literature addresses the
importance of partisan differences in response to globalization, taking into account the fact that
2 The term party’s identity refers to the ideological group of a party, e.g. communist, social democratic, Christian
democratic, conservative etc.
5left-wing parties are inherently distant in their ideology from right-wing parties, having
different social groups of representation (e.g. Hibbs, 1987; Bonoli and Powel, 2004).
However, some studies have found that as the economic globalization increases, the parties
converge to their economic policies due to the constraints of globalization which reduce the
available policies (Dorussen and Nanou, 2013; Ward et al., 2015). We adopt this view also for
parties’ overall position and assume that globalization leads to party convergence, but not on
rightist positions. That is because globalization makes the positions of mainstream left-wing
parties more attractive to society. As economic globalization increases, people demand state
intervention for protection against the external risk (Burgoon, 2012, for a review), while as
social globalization increases, the interaction among people from different countries, makes
society more sensitive to social and redistribution issues. Therefore right-wing parties respond
to globalization by moderating their position, adopting positions closer to their rivals. Based on
this rationale a second hypothesis is produced, labeled as Globalization leads to party
convergence (H2).
In order to test the two hypotheses we conduct an empirical analysis whose findings
contribute to the literature, giving remarkable explanations for the emerging results. Last but
not least, contrary to the existing studies which use parties’ overall position, we extend our data
to the first decade of 2000 where economic and social globalization has seen greatly
accelerate.3
3 Data and Empirical Specification
3.1 Measuring party position
We construct an annual panel dataset, where the cases comprise parties/year for 34 political
parties of 17 West European countries over the period 1970-2010. We include two types of
parties of each country, a left-wing and a right-wing party, which satisfy two main constraints.
First, parties should be mainstream parties because they are more credible in their electoral
programs than niche parties (e.g. Green, Communist).4 Electoral programs of mainstream
parties consist of feasible positions as they are more likely to enter into government, and hence
3 The first decade of 2000s has been noted as very important by Adams et al. (2009).
4 Adams et al. (2006) have shown that mainstream parties respond to the environment more than “niche” parties
because the latter have strict policy beliefs.
6to be punished by the electorate for unfeasible policies (Dorussen and Nanou, 2013). Second,
parties should have long-standing representation in electoral competition by participating in at
least four national elections from 1970 to 2010. We do this because parties with long
participation in the elections have a bigger electoral cost than parties with short participation
and they move their position more conscious and strategic.
Based on the literature and under the above constraints we include a social democratic
as left-wing party and a Christian democratic as right-wing party. In the case that more than one
party satisfies the above constraints we choose the one with the highest average vote share at all
the elections; most of the times this party is also this with the longest participation in elections.
In the case of Great Britain and France we use conservative parties instead of Christian
democratic parties because we found no evidence for Christian democratic parties which
participate more than once in elections. All the included parties and descriptive statistics of the
variables employed are presented in Appendix.
In order to evaluate the main hypotheses we use a measure for party positioning on
ideological scale (left-right) which is derived from the database of Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) and has been used in numerous studies (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010;
Ward et al., 2011). This measure represents a party’s overall position with registered references
about a broad spectrum of issues according to parties’ electoral programs,5 which are well-
researched and attempt to shape election outcome by affecting the public (Green and Hobolt,
2008). After all, a party’s overall position reflects the image and the differentiation of a party
comparatively with another.
Thus, the dependent variable is a measure, labeled as party’s overall position, which
ranges from -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right).6 It shows the point of a party’s position
in ideological scale, according to its official electoral program (manifesto) at every national
election.7 It should be noted that CMP provides data about position of each party separately,
5 The registered references refer to issues related to economy, labor, society, welfare state, justice, democracy and
external relationships.
6 This measure indicates the left-right position as given in Michael Laver and Ian Budge (1992) and is constructed
by subtracting the sum of categories related with left positions from the sum of categories related with right
positions. It includes quasi-sentences about welfare state, education, economy, market regulation, law and order,
morality, internationalism, democracy, social groups and human rights.
7 Electoral programs are being written before every election and express party’s position until the next elections
when new programs are being written. The overall position of a party is announced at the year of election and we
assume that party keeps this position until the next election based on Imbeau (2009) who supports that political
parties follow policies consistent to their position on electoral programs. Moreover, Osterloh and Debus (2012)
have mentioned that the positions included in parties’ manifestos are strongly linked with the actual subsequent
policies that are implemented during the period until the next elections.
7even if the party belongs to a coalition. In general a positive coefficient of this measure
indicates a move to the right which implies policies in favor of market deregulation,
retrenchments in crisis and reduction of welfare state. Instead, a negative coefficient indicates a
move to the left which means policies promoting market regulation, expansion of welfare state,
favorable actions to labor groups and state intervention into the economy.
3.2 Measuring globalization
Our main independent variables consist of the KOF globalization indices developed by Dreher
(2006). We use the separate indices for economic, social and political globalization and an
overall index which combines these three dimensions of globalization (Dreher, 2006; updated
in Dreher et al., 2008a). As Ward et al. (2011) have noticed many studies use various indicators
for economic globalization as independent variables in the same regression with high
correlation between them. The use of Dreher’s indices not only helps us to avoid the above
problem, but also gives us the opportunity to control for social and political globalization
besides economic.
There are three sub-indices of globalization; economic globalization takes into account
only trade, investment flows and restrictions on these flows. On the other hand social
globalization is elaborated on the basis of data on communication among people from different
countries (e.g. telecom traffic, degree on tourism and stock of foreign people on total
population), information flows (e.g. internet users, international newspaper traded) and cultural
proximity (e.g. trade books). Finally, political globalization accounts whether the country is
connected with other countries by measuring the number of embassies in a country, the
membership in international organizations, missions and treaties.8 As the KOF indices are
highly correlated, each is used in separate regressions. However, an index comprising all three
above sub-indices is also used (denoted as Total globalization). All the globalization indices
range from 1 (minimum value of globalization) to 100 (maximum value of globalization).
3.3 Other independent variables
Since there is no accepted theoretical model for our empirical estimations, we include a set of
control variables in order to correctly specify our baseline model. Following the literature (see
e.g. Dreher et al., 2008b; Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012) we use control variables related to
economic, demographic and political factors.
8 For more information see Dreher (2006).
8First, we use the growth rate of GDP per capita (growth) which is expected to have
either a positive or negative sign. On the one hand, low growth rates may lead parties to more
left positions to confront recession, but on the other hand left positions with increasing
expenditure are more likely at times of economic prosperity (Dreher 2006). The second control
is the inflation rate (inflation) as measured by the GDP deflator. According to studies on
Partisan Cycles (e.g. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Herwartz and Theilen, 2014) higher rates of
inflation affect mainly right-wing parties by moving them rightward in order to control
inflation, and leave left-wing parties uninfluenced. For this reason, we also include the
interaction term between inflation and left-wing parties (leftxinflation).
To take into account the level of development in each country, a country’s relative
income (relative_income) is included in the set of regressors. This variable is measured as the
proportion of a country’s GDP per capita in relation to the average sample GDP per capita. We
also include a demographic variable, the age dependency ratio (dependency), which is measured
by the number of persons in the age group 0-15 and 65+, as a ratio of the working age
population. A higher rate of inactive population leads parties towards left with more social
spending and measures favorable for vulnerable groups (Leibrecht et al., 2011). All the above
controls are taken from the World Bank’s Development Indicator Database.
The last control variable is related to political factors and mostly used in political
studies. This variable is the effective number of parties (Eff_no._par) which weights the
number of parties in the legislature by their vote share and is taken from the Armingeon et al.
(2015) published dataset. The inclusion of this variable in the model captures the effect of
changes in the institutional system in the same country across time (Dorussen and Nanou,
2013).9 However, we do not have an a priori expectation on the sign of this variable.
Last but not least, we include a variable, labeled as party_position_abroad, in order to
control if the position of a party in a particular country depends on the average positions of
similar parties in other countries.10 In simple terms, we estimate if the position of the left-wing
(right-wing) party in a particular country, e.g. Spain, is affected by the average positions of left-
wing (right-wing) parties in all other countries of the sample. Specifically,
party_position_abroad is the average of the positions that similar parties in other countries take
and is expressed by the equation bellow:
9 The corresponding effect across countries is captured by the fixed effects estimator.
10 With the term similar parties we mean parties which belong in the same party group, i.e. the group of left-wing
parties or the group of right-wing parties.
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where the numerator shows the sum of the positions of parties, in all other countries except i ,
which belong in the same ideological group with party j . The denominator, n , represents the
number of corresponding parties in other countries of the sample and is equal to sixteen (16).11
We have also calculated the weighted average of parties’ positions in other countries using as
weight the inverse of the distance of GDP per capita between country i and k and the results
remain the same.12 However, the baseline specification includes the variable
party_position_abroad ( jit ) as described in equation (1) because European parties tend to be
affected by the common trend of parties in the rest of Europe, regardless of the level of GDP
per capita and even more the geographical distance among countries. Finally, we use the lag
value of jit as it takes time for a party to respond to positions of parties in other countries.
Thus, the baseline model is formulated as follows:
 ititjit lizationleftxGlobabionGlobalizatbbPosition 210
jittjitjit Xbb    413 (2)
Where Positionjit represents the overall position of party j in country i at time t .13 The
position of each party is measured at every election year and remains the same until the next
elections where takes a new value. Globalizationit denotes the globalization rate in country i ,
where party j belongs, at time t and takes the value of only one index of globalization
(economic, social, political or total) in each regression in order to avoid problems with
multicollinearity. The term leftxGlobalizationit is the interaction term between globalization and
the dummy for left-wing parties, which takes the value 0 for right-wing parties and value 1 for
left-wing parties. Finally, 1 jit is the average of parties’ positions in other countries at time
1t and Xit includes the additional control variables of country i where party j belongs at
time t .
11 The sample includes 34 parties, 17 left-wing and 17 right-wing parties, so the number of left-wing or right-wing
parties in other countries except country i is equal to sixteen ( 16n ).
12 The estimated results with the weighted average are available upon request.
13 The dependent variable Positionjit takes values every year despite the fact that elections are not annual. Partieskeep the same position in their electoral program until the next elections.
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To decide between the use of fixed effects or random effects we apply the standard
Hausman test which showed that the appropriate specification is the fixed effects model. We
also test if the use of time dummies is appropriate by applying an F test in our baseline
specification and we found that time dummies are needed in our model. Therefore, the model
includes party fixed effects γj in order to eliminate bias due to the effect of unmeasured
variables that are strictly exogenous, time effects δt which are found to be significant and εjit is
the error term. Lastly, it should be noted that the dummy variable left is not included as a single
independent variable because it is already included in party fixed effects γj.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we present the main results of the empirical model, as well as a variety of
robustness tests in order to verify the validity of them. Our aim is to identify the aspects of
globalization that affect political parties and find out the precise effect of them on parties’
positions, controlling for partisan differences. All the regressions are estimated with time and
party fixed effects and the standard errors are estimated as Robust Clustered Standard Errors in
order to control for both heteroskedasticity and correlation of the error terms (Beck and Katz,
1995).
4.1. Baseline results
4.1.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 (H1)
The main results are reported in Table 1, where the baseline equation (2) is estimated four times
using a different index of globalization in each regression (total, economic, social and political).
Columns (2), (4), (6), (8) include all the covariates introduced above, while columns (1), (3),
(5), (7) estimate the same results including only the main independent variable with the
interaction term for left-wing parties. As can be seen, the results remain the same in any
column.
[Table 1, here]
In the first two columns we estimate the baseline model using the index of total
globalization which combines all the three dimensions of globalization (economic, social and
political). The coefficient of Total_globalization is statistically significant at the 1% level and
the negative sign indicates that an increase of total globalization moves right-wing parties to
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more left positions. On the other hand the coefficient of interaction term Total_global.xleft
(1.465) has a positive sign and is of similar magnitude as the coefficient of Total_globalization
(-1.315). Given that the effect of total globalization on leftist parties is the sum of the
coefficients of Total_globalization and Total_global.xleft, which seems to be small (-1.315 +
1.465 = 0.15), total globalization has no effect on positions of left-wing parties. Moreover, we
perform an F-test that fails to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that left-wing parties remain
unresponsive to total globalization. Therefore, in substantive terms, a one standard deviation
increase in total globalization is associated with an approximately one standard deviation
leftward movement for right-wing parties and with no movement for left-wing parties.
The regressions in the next columns suggest that the effect of total globalization is
mainly driven by economic and social globalization since these two indices of globalization
appear statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level in all the regressions (columns 3-6).
On the other hand, political globalization has less effect on a party’s overall position as the
coefficient turns out to be statistically significant only in column (8) at the 10% level. These
results give support to the first hypothesis (H1) under which party’s position is affected not
only by economic globalization but also by social globalization. More precisely, these outcomes
indicate that both economic and social globalization belong to the critical factors that affect
parties’ electoral programs while political globalization seems to have less influence.
Consequently, globalization does not only have influence for policy but also for politics.
There are two possible explanations for the above results. The first obvious explanation
is that a shift in economic globalization implies a shift in the economic stability of a country
while a shift in social globalization alters the coherence of society; therefore parties respond to
them in order to control and keep balance in the economy and society. The second explanation
is that political parties seek electoral support, and hence, they are influenced by factors that
influence voters’ preferences, such as economic and social globalization. According to Rodrik
(1998), economic globalization is directly linked to income stability, which is an important
criterion for people’s vote, and affects voters’ preferences. On the other hand, social
globalization provides external information to voters, affecting their attitude towards some
economic, social or labor issues (Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). It can be considered such an
alternative of the Meltzer-Richard problem in which parties follow voters’ preferences which
are formulated according to the level of economic and social globalization in their country.
Therefore, parties decide to alter or not their position in order to be closer to the preferences of
society and keep economic and social stability.
12
4.1.2 Testing Hypothesis 2 (H2)
In order to determine the direction that parties move towards, we should focus on the sign of
coefficients. The coefficients of both economic and social globalization have the same sign and
statistical significance with those of total globalization; consequently the estimated results for
right-wing parties remain the same as above. As far as left-wing parties are concerned, they
appear not to alter their position in response to economic globalization14 but they move
rightward in response to social globalization since the sum of the coefficients of
Social_globalization and Social_global.xleft is equal to 0.402 and statistically significant at the
5% level.15 So, right-wing parties present a leftward movement whereas left-wing parties
remain irremovable in the face of economic globalization and make a relatively smaller
rightward movement in response to social globalization. The finding that left-wing parties are
less responsive to economic globalization is consistent with previous studies of Adams et al.
(2009) and Haupt (2010).
Concerning the substantive magnitude of these effects, a one standard deviation increase
in economic or social globalization leads right-wing parties to move their position 14-point or
11-point, respectively, towards left.16 On the other hand, left-wing parties do not show any
movement in an increase of economic globalization but they move their position 6-point
towards right in a one standard deviation increase of social globalization. Although the two
types of parties move to opposite directions in the face of social globalization, the leftward
movement of right-wing parties is greater than the rightward movement of left-wing parties,
indicating that right-wing parties come closer to the position of left-wing parties. Given that
left-wing parties remain in the same position or move rightward, while right-wing parties move
leftward, a convergence between political parties emerges in response to globalization (either
economic or social), but not to the right. So, the estimated results give support to the second
hypothesis (H2), as well.
Even though both economic and social globalization lead parties to converge in their
positions, the explanation of each effect is different. Economic globalization imposes
constraints on the potential positions of parties on the grounds that it is perceived as threat by a
14 Since the sum of the coefficients of Econ_globaization and Econ_global.xleft is equal to zero (-0.989+0.989=0),
economic globalization has zero effect on left-wing party’s position.
15 The statistical significance of the coefficient results from the implementation of an F-test which rejects the null
hypothesis of insignificant coefficient at the 5% level.
16 We refer the standardized coefficients because of allowing assessment of the relative size of the associations of
independent variable with the dependent variable. The standard deviation of economic globalization is equal to
14.22, while the standard deviation of social globalization is equal to 14.35.
13
big part of society which wants to be secured (Rodrik, 1998). In simple terms, economic
globalization makes the position of mainstream left-wing parties more attractive to voters who
demand more state intervention and generally more left, but not extreme left, measures.
Therefore, mainstream left-wing parties, such as social democrats, have no incentive to move
rightward and at the same time they cannot move leftward due to the fear of capital flight
abroad causing weakness of financing public expenditures. On the other hand, right-wing
parties posses positions in favor of middle and up class and they cannot move further to the
right in response to economic globalization because they risk losing support from a part of
middle class. Instead they need to move leftward in order to make their position more attractive
to those of middle class that feel vulnerable against economic globalization.
The effect of social globalization, however, is attributed to a different explication. While
economic globalization creates insecurities, social globalization informs voters for possible
externalities and facilitates the transmission of ideas, making the society more open to other
cultures and foreign population. Therefore right-wing parties relax their overall position to
seem more sensitive to social issues. However, the same does not apply to left-wing parties, as
they take more right positions in an increase of social globalization. That is because social
globalization informs workers about the negative externalities making them to recognize their
limited bargaining power and hence union membership is reduced (Dreher and Gaston, 2007).
Since union members are more linked with left-wing parties, the latter move their position to
the right because their target group of voters is reduced. It should be mentioned that a part of
society perceives social globalization as a threat for the nation and demand positions further to
the right, but this group of people appeals to extreme right-wing parties which are niche parties
and are excluded of our analysis.
Furthermore, the estimated results in Table 1 indicate the existence of interaction
between political parties from different countries, as the coefficient of the average parties’
positions abroad (Party_position_abroad) bears a negative and statistical significant coefficient
at the 1% level in all the regressions. In simple terms, this suggests that a left-wing (right-wing)
party in a particular country is affected by the average position of left-wing (right-wing) parties
in other European countries at the previous year. The negative sign, however, indicates that
parties move their position in an opposite direction from this that the corresponding parties in
other countries took at the previous year. This finding is contrary to expectations that European
parties of the same ideological group obtain common positions, but is not irrational. Parties
might try to separate themselves from the average in Europe, especially when the positions of
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corresponding parties in other countries are disapproved by society. This effect also might
occur because our analysis does not include only governing parties, therefore parties do not
always have incentive to emulate parties in other countries.
As far as the rest variables are concerned, the inflation rate seems to have a positive and
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for right-wing parties, giving support to our
expectations. This result implies that higher inflation leads right-wing parties to further right
positions in order to control inflation and avoid harmful distributive consequences for their
target groups. In contrast, the interaction term of inflation rate with left-wing parties is
negatively signed but statistically significant at the 10% level only in two regressions in
columns (4) and (8), indicating that inflation have greater effect on right-wing parties (Hibbs,
1987). The rest of the controls seem to have no effect on parties’ position as they have
insignificant coefficients in all regressions.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section we carry out an additional analysis in order to evaluate the robustness of our
main findings for economic, social and total globalization. All the robustness tests explored
with respect to the econometric approach applied. First we check if our results are influenced by
cross-sectional dependence, i.e., the correlation among units (parties in our case). Second we
estimate our results using some alternative control variables, as well as a Jackknife analysis.
Finally we perform an instrumental variable approach in order to mitigate concerns for potential
endogeneity or omitted variable bias.17
4.2.1 Testing for cross-sectional dependence
The first type of robustness test confirms that the existence of cross-sectional dependence does
not cause problems in our estimates. In general, panel data sets are likely to appear cross-
sectional dependence due to common shocks or unobservable factors that become part of error
term or due to pair-wise dependence in the disturbances (DeHoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). By
performing the Pesaran’s (2004) CD test we find it necessary to re-estimate the baseline model,
correcting for cross-sectional dependence and ensuring that the main findings remain the same.
Therefore, we re-estimate the main specification using Driscoll and Kraay estimator,
which is robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence, as well as with
17 The baseline model and robustness tests have also been estimated with the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable and produce the same results; estimations are available upon request.
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Panel Correct Standard Errors (PCSE), which is a parametric method to correct
contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007)18. The estimated results are
presented in Table 2, where the first three columns represent the Driscoll-Kraay estimates while
the last three columns represent the PCSE estimates. Although the regressions include all the
control variables, we present only these that are of interest. As we can see the empirical
findings remain qualitatively identical to those depicted in Table 1, as all the variables appear
similar coefficients and statistical significance.
4.2.2 Alternative Controls and Jackknife estimations
The next robustness check is the use of some alternative control variables such as
unemployment rate and GDP per capita. Table 3 displays these results, where columns (1)-(3)
show the baseline regression with the log of GDP per capita instead of both growth rate and
relative income, while columns (4)-(6) show the same regression with unemployment rate
instead of inflation rate. We also include an interaction term between unemployment and left-
wing parties, as we do for inflation rate, because left-wing parties might respond to
unemployment differently from right-wing parties (Hibbs, 1987). Note that we do not include
unemployment and inflation rate in the same regression because they are correlated to each
other according to Phillips Curve, as well as growth rate is related to unemployment rate via
Okun’s  law. In each of the eight columns of Table 3 the results remain unaltered.
In Table 4 we replicate the fixed effects estimates of Table 1 and perform a Jackknife
type analysis, by excluding one party at time. More precisely, columns (1) and (3) display the
min and max value (respectively) of the coefficients of the main independent variables
according to Jackknife estimates. Columns (2) and (4) show the political party that has the
corresponding min and max value, while column (5) presents the estimated coefficient of our
baseline model (see Table 1). Through this approach we verify that the estimated coefficients of
total, economic and social globalization in Table 1 belong in the interval between their max and
min value.
4.2.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Strategy
Most of the studies that examine the responsiveness of party’s position do not perform an
instrumental variable (IV) analysis supposing that the reverse causality issue cannot exist since
they do not use implemented policies as regressors. Nevertheless, we consider important to deal
18 Both methods are also robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
16
with issue of omitted variable bias as well as reverse causality, i.e. the fact that globalization is
affected by parties’ positions. We do this through a 2SLS identification strategy, instrumenting
for all types of globalization that are found to have a strong effect on parties’ positions (i.e.
total, economic and social globalization) and their interaction terms.
The challenge in our case is to find a valid instrument which is adequately correlated with
all the globalization indices and remain uncorrelated with parties’ positions and the
disturbances. It is a challenge because KOF indices of globalization are components of a variety
of variables, so we should find an instrument that affects globalization but is not included in
any of the indices of globalization. Given all the above, we use as an instrument the human
capital index which is highly correlated with each of the three indices of globalization (total,
economic and social) with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.7 and zero correlated with parties’
positions.19
The motivation of choosing this instrument rests on studies that have found a positive
relationship between globalization and human capital (e.g. Hickman and Olney, 2011).
Countries with higher human capital tend to be more globalized either economically (e.g. have
more imports, exports) or socially (e.g. have more foreign people and multiculturalism). Lastly,
we use the lagged value of the instrumented variable as an additional instrument.
Table 5 presents the IV fixed effects regression with robust standard errors and year
dummies. Panel A represents the 2SLS estimates instrumenting globalization (total, economic
and social) with human capital index (HCI) and one lag of globalization (Globalization_t-1), as
well as instrumeting the interaction term of globalization with the interaction term of human
capital with dummy left (HCIxleft) and the interaction term of one lag of globalization with
dummy left (Globalization_t-1xleft). Although we include all the control variables of the
baseline specification in IV model, we present only the independent variables of interest. Panel
B represents the first stage estimates where instruments are regressed on instrumental variables.
Every 2SLS estimate has two regressions on the first stage as we instrument both globalization
and globalizationxleft, which reflect to columns (1a)-(6a) and (1b)-(6b), respectively.
Globalization_t-1 and Globalization_t-1xleft correspond to the type of globalization (total,
economic or social) indicated in each column. As we can see, the excluded instruments F
statistic exceeds 10 at every regression, indicating that the instruments are sufficiently strong
(Staiger and Stocks, 1997).
19 Human capital index (HCI) is based on years of schooling and comes from Penn World Table (8.0).
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Our theoretical priors are confirmed as the human capital index in most regressions in the
first stage has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, denoting that has a positive
impact on globalization. In the second stage (Panel A) the coefficients of total, economic and
social globalization, as well as their interaction terms with dummy left remain the same, in
terms of both statistical significant and sign, as in our prior estimates. In addition, the
coefficient of Party_position_abroad still has the same sign and statistical significant with this
in Table 1 in all the regressions.
Regarding the validity of our instruments we should note that in all regressions the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic (Cragg-Donald_F_stat.) is above the critical values produced by Stock-
Yogo, which implies the rejection of null hypothesis of weak identified model. In addition, the
statistical significance of Kleibergen-Paap statistic (K-P_rk_Lm_stat) at the 1% level implies
the rejection of underidentification assumption; therefore the model is not underidentified.
Finally, the whole results indicate that the main findings in Table 1 are strong and valid under
many specifications and robustness tests.
5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effect of the dimensions of globalization – economic, social and
political – on parties’ overall position in European countries between 1970 and 2010. Given
that political parties have different ideological basis and target groups of voters our analysis
controls for differences in responsiveness to globalization among parties. Three main findings
derive from the empirical analysis. First, both economic and social globalization have a
significant effect on party’s position, while political globalization seems to have a less strong
effect. Second, parties found to respond differently to economic and social globalization
depending on their ideological identity. Specifically, right-wing parties adopt more left
positions in an increase of economic or social globalization, whereas left-wing parties do not
alter their position in an increase of economic globalization and move rightward in response to
social globalization. Obviously, these findings strongly suggest a convergence of political
parties, but not to the right.
Moreover we found support for a third argument that benefits us to better understand the
role of competition for parties. This suggests that political parties respond to the positions of
parties of the same ideological group in other countries but they do not emulate them. Given
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that the empirical analysis includes both governing and no governing parties, this is not an
unexpected result.
The analysis in total seems to be in contrast with the view held in the literature that
globalization leads parties to more right positions (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett, 2001) and those that
find evidence about a convergence to the right (Ward et al., 2011) or no convergence (Haupt,
2010). However, the estimated results stand in line with existing evidence documented in
papers which examine parties’ positions on economic policies (Dorussen and Nanou, 2013).
Moreover, they are partly consistent with the analysis of Adams et al. (2009), although our
analysis relies on a more extended time period and is based on different econometric approach.
Lastly, in contrast with the studies mentioned above, our analysis controls for the effect of
parties’ positions in other countries and concludes that parties are affected by domestic factors
such as economic and social globalization as well as by the positions of parties in the rest
Europe.
These results taken all together suggest that parties choose their position influenced by
both economic and social globalization, as well as, that differences occur in responsiveness of
left-wing and right-wing parties that cause party convergence but not towards right. Moreover,
the results point out that parties at home are influenced by the average position of parties
abroad. Finally, globalization (economic and social) and the positions of parties abroad are
factors that influence the strategic choice of a party’s position and hence they have implications
for party competition.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1 Parties included in the empirical analysis
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project
Country Left-wing Party Right-wing Party
Austria Social Democratic Party People's Party
Belgium Francophone Socialist Party Christian People's Party
Denmark Social Democratic Party Christian People's Party
Finland Social Democrats Christian Union
France Socialist Party Union for French Democracy
Germany Social Democratic Party Christian Democrats
Great Britain Labour Party Conservative Party
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Ireland Labour Party Fine Gael
Italy Socialist Party Christian Democrats
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party Christian Social People's Party
Netherlands Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Norway Labour Party Christian People’s Party
Portugal Socialist Party Centre Social Democrats
Spain Socialist Workers' Party Centre Democrats
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party Christian Democratic Community
Switzerland Social Democratic Party Christian Democrats
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Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Source
Party’s position -7.19 19.81 -58.11         78.85 CMP
(all parties included)
Social democratic -18.62 14.97 -58.11         43.24 CMP
parties’ position
Christian democratic 5.67 16.43 -26.12         78.85 CMP
parties’ position
Total globalization 75.27 11.19 49.02         92.72 Dreher et al. (2006)
Economic globalization 73.45 14.22 42.85 98.88 Dreher et al. (2006)
Social globalization 69.98 14.35 36.73 91.25 Dreher et al. (2006)
Political globalization 85.30 12.92 45.9 98.43 Dreher et al. (2006)
Growth 2.18 2.63 -8.71 13.62 World Bank
Relative income 1 0.44 0.25 2.82 Constructed
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.05 0.43 0.73              World Bank
Inflation rate 5.85 5.46 -5.2 27.21 World Bank
Effective parties 4.55              1.6 2.27 10.29 Armingeon et al.
(2015)
GDP per capita 30548 13435 7487 86127 World Bank
Unemployment rate 6.1 3.74 0 20.06 OECD Economic
Outlook (2013)
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Table 1 Parties in response to globalization: Basic findings
D.V: Party’s Overall Position
(1)               (2)               (3)               (4)               (5)               (6)               (7) (8)
Total_globalization -0.876** -1.315***
(-2.463) (-4.154)
Total_global.xleft 0.564** 1.465***
(2.213) (6.412)
Econ._globalization -0.703** -0.989***
(-2.205) (-3.761)
Econ_global.xleft 0.510** 0.989***
(2.117) (5.258)
Social_globalization -0.390** -0.744***
(-2.172) (-4.397)
Social_global.xleft 0.452** 1.146***
(2.381) (6.051)
Political_global. -0.199 -0.266*
(-0.975) (-1.809)
Political_global.xleft 0.169 0.300
(0.740) (1.635)
Party_position_abroad -2.377*** -1.990*** -2.314*** -1.525***
(-6.899) (-5.614) (-7.367) (-4.492)
Growth 0.101 0.105 0.147 0.151
(0.377) (0.426) (0.518) (0.591)
Relative_Income -5.546 -7.160 -1.120 -2.247
(-1.106) (-1.115) (-0.353) (-0.445)
Inflation 0.697*** 0.958*** 0.645** 1.370***
(3.749) (3.394) (2.674) (3.647)
Inflation.xleft -0.583 -0.959** -0.426 -1,645**
(-1.415) (-2.161) (-0.924) (-3.275)
Dependency -0.179 2.631 6.204 -2.912
(-0.010) (0.126) (0.292) (-0.101)
Eff._no._parties 0.669 0.641 0.939 0.754
(0.629) (0.593) (0.929) (0.671)
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 1218 1177 1218 1177 1218 1177 1218 1177
R-squared 0.13 0.27 0.14 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.10 0.19
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors.t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
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Table 2 Correcting cross-sectional dependence
D.V: Party’s Overall Position
Driscoll-Kraay estimates Panel Correct Standard Errors (PCSE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)                   (6)
Total_globalization -1.375*** -0.682***
(-4.637) (-3.294)
Total_global. x left 1.465*** 0.869***
(5.728) (4.771)
Econ_globalization -0.989*** -0.842***
(-4.473) (-4.835)
Econ_global.xleft 0.989*** 0.750***
(4.657) (4.281)
Social_globalization -0.744*** -0.327***
(-5.653) (-2.851)
Social_global.xleft 1.146*** 0.613***
(8.106) (4.808)
Party_position_abroad -2.377*** -1.990*** - 2.314*** -0.882*** -0.715*** -0.827***
(-9.368) (-7.587) (-11.594) (-5.149) (-4.342) (-4.907)
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.40 0.38 0.40
Notes: The regressions in the first three columns are estimated with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, include
two-way fixed effects and are based on four lags; nevertheless the results are robust to decrease the lag structure to
three, two or one lags. The regressions in the last three columns are estimated with panel correct standard errors
(PCSE) and include year and party dummies.t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
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Table 3 Alternative independent variables
D.V: Party’s Overall Position
Inflation and GDP per capita                       Unemployment and GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total_globalization -1.373*** -1.508***
(-4.463) (-4.407)
Total_global.xleft 1.465*** 1.539***
(6.488) (6.297)
Econ_globalization -0.966*** -1.086***
(-4.099) (-3.730)
Econ_global.xleft 0.987*** 1.017***
(5.522) (5.325)
Social_globalization -0.751*** -0.784***
(-4.503) (-3.969)
Social_global.xleft 1.141*** 1.136***
(6.143) (5.640)
Party_position_abroad -2.375*** -1.989*** -2.309*** -2.280*** -1.798*** -2.346***
(-6.898) (-5.626) (-7.418) (-5.887) (-4.516) (-6.515)
ln_GDPpercapita -14.291 -15.414 -8.911 -19.961 -28.113* -17.353
(-1.534) (-1.408) (-1.135) (-1.526) (-1.796) (-1.356)
Inflation 0.663*** 0.915*** 0.635**
(3.729) (3.230) (2.667)
Inflation.xleft -0.584 -0.963** -0.423
(-1.446) (-2.196) (-0.921)
Unemployment -0.430 -0.482 -0.673
(-0.959) (-0.946) (-1.356)
Unemp.xleft 0.963 1.069 1.034
(1.356) (1.390) (1.361)
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 1177 1177 1177 1057 1057 1057
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.26
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors.t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
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Table 4 Jackknife Estimation
Regression with total globalization
Min_coef. Party Max_coef. Party Estimated_coef.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total_globalization -1.522*** right-wing (German) -1.214*** right-wing (Finland) -1.315***
Total_global.xleft 1.324*** right-wing (Finland) 1.591*** right-wing (German) 1.465***
Party_pos_abroad -2.522 right-wing (Luxembourg) -2.166*** left-wing (Finland) -2.377***
Regression with economic globalization
Min_coef. Party Max_coef. Party Estimated_coef.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Econ_globalization -1.134*** right-wing (Austria) -0.787*** right-wing (Finland) -0.989***
Econ_global._x_left 0.812*** right-wing (Finland) 1.080*** right-wing (Austria) 0.989***
Party_pos_abroad -2.192***    right-wing (Luxembourg) -1.763*** left-wing (Finland) -1.990**
Regression with social globalization
Min_coef. Party Max_coef. Party                  Estimated_coef.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social_globalization -0.823*** right-wing (Belgium) -0.661*** right-wing (Austria) -0.774***
Social_global.xleft 1.068*** right-wing (Finland) 1.222*** left-wing (Belgium) 1.146***
Party_pos_abroad -2.409*** right-wing (Italy) -2.157*** left-wing   (Finland) -2.314***
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present the min and max value (respectively) of coefficients of the independent
variables according to Jackknife estimates. Columns (2) and (4) present the political party that has the
corresponding value and Column (5) presents the estimated coefficients of our baseline model (see Table1) in
order to verify that they belong in the interval between their min and max value. All regressions include two-way
fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors.
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%
28
Table 5 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Panel A: 2SLS estimates fixed effects and robust standard errors
(1)                 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total_globalization -2.144*** -1.598***
(-3.217) (-8.996)
Total_global.xleft 1.894*** 1.552***
(4.103) (9.826)
Econ_globalization -1.842*** -1.005***
(-3.316) (-7.786)
Econ_global.xleft 1.642*** 0.954***
(8.608) (7.613)
Social_globalization -1.792*** -0.849***
(-2.600) (-7.694)
Social_global.xleft 1.450*** 1.180***
(8.588) (10.237)
Party_position_abroad -2.596** -2.371*** -2.646*** -2.385*** -1.977*** -2.394***
(-10.899) (-10.079) (-10.415) (-10.771) (-9.214) (-10.806)
Observations 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137
F-stat_excl_instr.[a] 37.85 28.60 11.50 3121.67 2941.9 220.24
F-stat_excl._instr.[b] 284.80 210.12 209.88 1577.23 3695.5 740.04
Cragg-Donald_F_stat. 27.30*** 18.32*** 7.81*** 965.60*** 2828.15*** 685.61***
K-P_rk_Lm_statistic 72.62*** 53.21*** 21.16*** 320.65*** 376.14*** 248.67***
Panel B: First-stage estimates
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Total_glob. Econ_glob. Social_glob. Total_glob.    Econ_glob. Social glob.
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
TotalxLeft EconxLeft SocialxLeft TotalxLeft EconxLeft SocialxLeft
Notes: Panel A represents 2SLS estimates. Cragg-Donald_F_stat. is the Cragg-Donald weak identification test
with the null hypothesis of weak identified model. K-P_rk_Lm_stat is the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test
with the null hypothesis of underidentified model. Panel B represents the first stage estimates and the excluded
instruments F statistic. Every 2SLS estimate has two regressions on the first stage as we instrument both
globalization and globalizationxleft, which reflect to columns (1a)-(6a) and (1b)-(6b), respectively.
Globalization_t-1 and Globalization_t-1xleft represent the type of globalization indicated in each column.
t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
HCI 6.409*** 7.539*** 6.183*** 0.412 0.702 0.603
(6.410) (5.211) (3.711) (0.578) (0.940) (0.559)
HCIxleft 0.024 0.501 -0.432 0.001 -0.230 -0.294
(0.022) (0.306) (-0.247) (0.001) (-0.267) (-0.228)
Globalization _t-1 0.883*** 0.947*** 0.841***
(32.413) (70.625) (23.028)
Globalization_ t-1xleft -0.004 0.002 0.001
(-0.125) (0.141) (0.011)
HCI -9.433*** -10.0791*** -14.153*** -0.168 0.405 -1.007**
(-10.151) (-9.720) (-10.395) (-0.582) (1.342) (-2.003)
HCIxleft 24.333*** 28.592*** 31.207*** 0.785 -0.036 2.138**
(23.864) (20.412) (20.484) (1.072) (-0.058) (2.461)
Globalization _t-1 -0.020* -0.002 -0.024**
(-1.793) (-0.240) (-2.520)
Globalization _t-1xleft 0.916*** 0.951*** 0.885***
(41.325) (74.160) (29.095)
